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POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE AUTHORIZATION FOR THE
USE OF MILITARY FORCE: UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES? 
Katie Magnus 
The Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) is a piece of legisla­
tion that was enacted shortly after the attacks on September 11, 2001. It states, 
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appro­
priate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such 
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, 
organizations or persons.25 
This almost sixty word sentiment laid the ambiguous foundation for the United 
States military policy in the post 9/11 era. Following the AUMF was the war 
in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq, as well as Special Forces operating in nations 
where the U.S. was not directly at war. More recently, during the end of the 
25 S.J.Res. 23 (107th): Authorization for Use of Military Force. 107th Congress, 2001–2002. 
Text as of Sep 18, 2001 (Passed Congress/Enrolled Bill) https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/107/ 
sjres23/text 
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Bush Administration and continuing throughout the Obama Administration, 
the U.S. utilized Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or drones to combat terrorists and/ 
or terrorist organizations within nations where the U.S. is not at war. Many of 
these policies have created new questions involving legality and the protection of 
an individual’s rights. A main implication of the AUMF has been the increased 
use of UAVs or drones as a counterterrorism tool. The paper will explore this 
implication, the elevation of drone usage, and the repercussions it has for the 
United States and the international community as a whole. 
Literature Review 
Much of the academic literature on this topic can be organized into several dif­
ferent camps, a few of which this literature review will feature. The schools of 
thought can be divided into about three groups; one group of scholars highlight 
the necessity of drones as a tool for the U.S., but also focus on the fact that the 
program needs to improve in the future. Another band of academics look at 
some of the legal aspects of UAVs, primarily arguing that the legal foundation 
utilized by the Bush and Obama Administrations for drone strikes is flawed. 
The last school of thought that will be discussed is the grouping of articles
that claim that UAVs are not useful at all, advocating against their usage. The 
United States’ drone program is controversial, so there are many topics covered 
throughout academia. The pieces reviewed for this paper comprise the most
general classifications. 
There are some scholars who showcase concern over the future of the drone 
campaign instead of focusing on past missteps of the campaign. A Foreign 
Affairs article by Kreps and Zenko recommends specific changes to the current 
administration’s policy, beginning with a reminder that the United States, as 
a world power, needs to lead by example. There will come a time when the 
global development of UAV technology will rival the technology of the United 
States. Nations looking to utilize drones for one reason or another will follow 
the precedents set by the U.S. Zenko and Kreps state, “Spurred by the United 
States’ example, other countries are likely to threaten or conduct drone strikes 
in ways that are harmful to U.S. interests, whether by provoking regional ad­
versaries or targeting domestic enemies.”26 More specifically, the authors argue 
26 Kreps, Sarah, and Micah Zenko. “The Next Drone Wars.” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 2 (March 
2014): 68-79. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed February 26, 2014). 
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Katie Magnus 
that the United States needs to restrain from drone proliferation, create an 
independent review panel to increase transparency, and that Congress needs to 
hold hearings to discuss the use of drones and the legal framework that allows it.27 
Other scholars who seriously critique the UAV program as a whole con­
trast the above point of view. Instead of offering changes for the future of U.S. 
drone policy, they focus on the seriousness of the flaws of the program. Michael 
Boyle, writing for International Affairs, explains the theory of blowback; Boyle 
is arguing that the positive outcomes of the drone program—killing terrorists— 
have not been accurately weighed against the negative outcomes.28 To explain 
further, Boyle only looks at the CIA-run drone campaigns outside theatres of 
war, and contends that the drone campaigns in Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan 
undermine the efficacy of local governments and open the door for extremist 
Islamic groups to gain recruits.29 He comes to the conclusion that the picture 
of the effectiveness of drones is not entirely what it may seem and follows up 
that notion with his possible solution; limiting drone strikes to high value 
targets (HVTs) only.30 
Agreeing with Boyle’s ideological stance on drones, Cronin authored a 
piece entitled “Why Drone’s Fail,” and argues against the effectiveness of the 
drone campaign as a whole. She begins with the idea that al Qaeda bears little 
to no resemblance to the other terrorist groups that have been successfully
“destroyed through decapitation,” or by the targeted killings of drone strikes.31 
The disparity lies in the fact that the successfully destroyed groups were charac­
terized by a cult of personality, hierarchical structure, and were no more than 
ten years old. Al Qaeda is a group that is about twenty-five years old and has 
a vast interconnected group of militants at its disposal. Cronin is disputing
the efficacy of using drones as a counterterrorism tool to combat Al Qaeda. 
However, she does not dispute the high levels of destruction that have afflicted 
al Qaeda. She states that even while the group may be more concerned with 
staying alive versus planning attacks on the homeland, al Qaeda still has the 
27 Ibid 
28 BOYLE, MICHAEL J. “The costs and consequences of drone warfare.” International Affairs 
89, no. 1 (January 2013): 1-29. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed March 1, 2014) 
29 Ibid 
30 Op. cit. fn. 4 
31 Cronin, Audrey Kurth. “Why Drones Fail.” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 4 (July 2013): 44-54. 
Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed March 10, 2014). 
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ability to “perpetuate its message.”32 Even if the militaristic wings of al Qaeda 
are unfocused and unsuccessful, the public relations campaign the organization 
is waging is keeping them afloat, hindering the United States’ long-term goal 
of demobilizing the group. While Cronin does not doubt the full efficacy of 
the U.S. drone program like Boyle does, she argues that the destruction of Al 
Qaeda will not come solely from UAVs. 
On the contrary, Byman in his piece “Why Drones Work,” focuses on 
the necessity of drones as a tool in the United States’ counterterrorism tool­
box, contrasting Cronin’s piece. He argues for targeting higher value terrorists 
along with the foot soldiers.33 “It has become more politically palatable for the 
United States to kill rather than detain suspected terrorists,” Byman suggests. 
He counters the arguments most commonly given by the critics of drones; the 
alternatives to drones (i.e. raids) are unreasonable, how difficult it is to counter 
terrorism with political or financial means (i.e. bringing nations out of poverty), 
and that nonproliferation is essentially futile.34 Byman does address the fact that 
drone strikes may be unpopular according to a poll taken in Pakistan in 2012, 
but again highlights the lack of better alternatives; “74 percent of Pakistanis 
viewed the United States as their enemy, likely in part because of the ongoing 
drone campaign…. It is hard to imagine that alternatives to drone strikes, such 
as SEAL team raids or cruise missile strikes, would make the United States 
more popular.” 
Cronin and Byman make convincing arguments in their respective pieces, 
and they both touch upon an important piece to the puzzle when it comes to 
drone policies, the legal basis for UAV strikes. Much of the legal framework for 
counterterrorism measures taken since 2001 comes from the Authorization for 
the Use of Military Force (AUMF). Cronin does concede that the authorization 
from Congress was most likely a necessity during that time, but she disagrees 
with what the authorization has morphed into. The ambiguous phrasing of the 
legislation may have been originally intentional, but currently, “In this endless 
contest, the United States risks multiplying its enemies and heightening their 
incentives to attack the country.”35 Byman does not completely agree with that 
32 Ibid 
33 Byman, Daniel. “Why Drones Work.” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 4 (July 2013): 32-43. Academic
Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed March 17, 2014). 
34 Ibid 
35 Op. cit. fn. 7 
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conclusion, but he does address the fact that the AUMF is twelve-plus years 
old, and it may not sufficiently cover the UAV program in its entirety. 
Research Findings 
Because much of the United States UAV program is shrouded in secrecy for 
national security reasons, it is difficult to decipher what are the concrete poli­
cies of the U.S. President Barack Obama, State Department Legal Advisor
Harold Koh, and Central Intelligence Agency Director John Brennan have all 
given speeches on the topic, which are continually referenced by government 
officials when drone policy questions are asked. Each set of remarks, President 
Obama’s, Koh’s, and Brennan’s, try to showcase the reasoning behind U.S. 
targeted killings by the way of drones. The AUMF was cited as being the legal 
basis for the actions taken. Other measures such as the increased transparency, 
though seemingly hollow, were outlined as well. In President Obama’s speech 
at National Defense University, he references written counterterrorism policy 
standards entitled, “Presidential Policy Guidance,” which outline the exact 
standards for the use of lethal force.36 Essentially, the policy standards reiterate 
what the White House and government agencies have been explaining to the 
American people. Lethal force is not an alternative for prosecution; it ideally 
is used only when there is a “continuing imminent threat to U.S. persons.”37 
The appropriate members of Congress have continuously been informed, the 
Department of Justice has been consulted to run legal analysis, but yet the 
President still maintains his authority to take action as he sees fit in a lawful 
manner, a reminder of the powerful legal authority the executive branch holds. 
Harold Koh, the State Department Legal Advisor, took a different approach 
in his speech at the American Society of International Law. Koh outlined what 
was dubbed an “Emerging ‘Obama-Clinton Doctrine’,” which is comprised of 
four different areas to which the U.S. is committed.38 The four areas correspond 
to the ideas that have been consistently iterated by the Obama administration, 
“…challenges of the twenty-first century can’t be met by any one leader or any 
36 “Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism 
Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities,” Press Secretary, The White 
House. May 23, 2013. 
37 Ibid 
38 Koh, Harold, “Legal Adviser Koh’s Speech on the Obama Administration and International 
Law, March 2010,” Council on Foreign Relations. March 25, 2010. 
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one nation,” simply saying that the international community needs to become 
more interdependent.39 These elements frame the United States as the multi­
lateral actor that former Secretary of State Clinton and President Obama may 
want the nation to be. Koh states, “U.S. targeting practices, including lethal 
operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply with 
all applicable law, including the laws of war.” It is the AUMF that authorizes 
the U.S. to use force from a domestic standpoint. There are different interna­
tional laws in place regarding the usage of force or more specifically targeted 
killings, however they disagree with the U.S.’s position and actions, so the 
federal government defers to domestic law. Koh’s remarks seemed to be aimed 
towards satisfying the public and possibly other U.S. representative’s calls for 
justification of the executive branch’s actions. The phrasing “ comply with all 
applicable law” aims to increase the legitimacy of Koh’s claims and attempts 
to decrease the legitimacy of the criticisms of the drone program. Further, it 
sets the precedent that the only legal framework that matters is the U.S.’s, not 
international law. 
At Harvard Law, John Brennan takes a more hawkish position stating, “… 
As President Obama has stated on numerous occasions, we reserve the right 
to take unilateral action if or when other governments are unwilling or un­
able to take the necessary actions themselves.” Continuing, Brennan almost 
walks back that previous statement by pointing out that the U.S. cannot just 
use military force whenever it pleases, because the U.S. respects international 
law and state sovereignty.40 Brennan tries to shed light on the perspectives of 
intelligence agencies and the military by explaining that the face of warfare is 
changing, underscoring the necessity of drones. The U.S. military does not face 
the same type of combatant as they once did; al Qaeda wears no uniform and 
does not carry weapons openly. Brennan takes a similar path as Koh by offer­
ing what seem to be justifications for U.S. missteps; he argues that President 
Obama has actually increased transparency by allowing the release of budgetary 
information, reconstituting the Intelligence Oversight Board, and declassifying 
legal memos.41 
39 Ibid 
40 Wittes, Benjamin. “John Brennan’s Remarks at HLS-Brookings Conference,” Lawfare: Hard 
National Security Choices, September 16, 2011. 
41 Ibid 
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These remarks made by high-level officials are more or less the public ver­
sion of the United States current UAV policy. Critics and skeptics are in no way 
satisfied with these claims and arguments because many of what are arguably 
the biggest questions surrounding the policies are unanswered. This has led to 
an outpouring of critiques regarding the current status of the program, how 
the U.S. should handle the program in the future, and assessments regarding 
the morality of the program as a whole. 
Essentially, there are groups within the U.S. and throughout the interna­
tional community that would like to see some hard data, some specifics, on the 
United States UAV program. There have been conflicting reports throughout 
news outlets on numbers of civilian causalities and the locations of U.S. drone 
strikes. Some specifics can be found; since 2008, the U.S. has administered 
1,000 plus drone strikes in Afghanistan. As of July 2013, the British had con­
ducted 299 drone strikes in Afghanistan comparatively. From 2008 onward,
the U.S. has launched 48 drone strikes in Iraq, approximately 145 in Libya, 
400 in Pakistan, 100 plus in Yemen, under 20 in Somalia, and possibly one in 
the Philippines.42 
Conclusions can be drawn when hard data is analyzed. While Cronin 
argues against the use of drones, she does cede the point that, “Political scien­
tists Patrick Johnston and Anoop Sarbahi recently found that drone strikes in 
northwestern Pakistan from 2007 to 2011 resulted in a decrease in the number 
and lethality of militant attacks in the tribal areas where they were conducted.”43 
There is definitely effectiveness to the weaponry; otherwise it would not be 
used on such a widespread scale. The effectiveness is only questioned insofar as 
the actual toll of civilian loss of life, and whether or not that leads to negative 
long-term effects, i.e. blowback. Cronin and Boyle, for example, both argue 
that the lasting impact drones have are adverse to the goals the administra­
tion is trying to achieve. The drones-first counterterrorism policy can be used 
as a recruiting tool for extremist organizations, undermine the stability and 
confidence of local governments, and increase anti-American sentiment. All 
of these implications have a high probability of being accurate. The “Times 
Square bomber” explained that his motives were directly related to drone strikes. 
More recently, the relationship between the United States and Pakistan has 
42 Op. cit. fn. 2 
43 Op. cit. fn. 7 
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been strained because the Pakistani government is facing hostile opposition to 
U.S. drone strikes. While the Pakistani government has often condemned the 
strikes in public, it is now widely known that they give the U.S. permission 
in private. In November 2013 there were protests in Peshawar, activists claim 
that the U.S. is hindering Pakistan’s peace process with the Pakistani Taliban, 
as they were just about to begin negotiations when a drone strike killed a top 
Taliban leader.44 
Drone strikes conducted on the Pakistani Taliban seem a long way from 
the policies described in the Authorization for the Use of Military Force. While 
the ambiguousness of the authorization is partly necessary to avoid obstacles 
regarding terrorist organizations changing their names to avoid sanctions, 
Cronin explains, “Washington now finds itself in a permanent battle with an 
amorphous and geographically dispersed foe, one with an increasingly marginal 
connection to the original 9/11 plotters. In this endless contest, the United 
States risks multiplying its enemies and heightening their incentives to attack 
the country.” Daniel Byman in his article contradicting Cronin’s piece does 
agree that Washington needs to improve drone policy to an extent. Speaking 
in regards to the targeting of Anwar Awlaki, the U.S. citizen that was targeted 
in Yemen, Byman states, “Yet with the war on terrorism almost 12 years old 
and bin Laden dead, critics, such as the Georgetown University law professor 
Rosa Brooks, have begun questioning whether the AUMF still justifies drone 
strikes today. As Brooks has argued, ‘Many of the groups now being identified 
as threats don’t fall clearly under the AUMF’S umbrella -- and many don’t pose 
a significant danger to the United States.’” 
The decision-making when it comes to deciding on drone strikes has been 
compared to a hostage situation, where police are not barred by the law from 
killing a hostage taker if they have a clear shot. Obviously there are some 
major differences between the urgency of a hostage situation at home and 
terrorists plotting miles away, but Mr. Leiter, former head of the National 
Counterterrorism Center, vocalizes that “[the president’s reliance on strikes] 
is far from a lurid fascination with covert action and special forces. It’s much 
44 Masood, Salman. Tipu Mehsud, Ihsanullah. “Thousands in Pakistan Protest American Drone 
Strikes,” The New York Times. November 23, 2013. 
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more practical. He’s the president. He faces a post-Abdulmutallab situation, 
where he’s being told people might attack the United States tomorrow.”45 
On top of the immediate policy implications are concerns of a drones arms 
race. The number of states with any type of drones has almost doubled since 
2004, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office. It is predicted 
that the civilian and military drone market will reach $8.4 billion by 2018, 
which will actually only be a portion of global defense spending which is sup­
posed to hit $1.9 trillion by the end of 2017.46 While the conjecture of a drone 
arms race may be farfetched, the advancements made in drone technology 
will make it easier to enter far away conflicts. Previously, when heads of state 
contemplated military action, they had to consider boots on the ground and 
the impact that would have. Now and in the future they will have the option 
to send an UAV to complete the obligations troops normally fulfill. 
Conclusion 
The Authorization for the Use of Military Force is a decade-plus old piece 
of legislation that had dictated the legal framework for the United States’ coun­
terterrorism policy following September 11, 2001. Developing throughout
the Bush Administration and continuing in the Obama Administration, the 
use of UAVs as the main tool for countering terrorists abroad has been a di­
rect implication of the AUMF. The ambiguous wording of the document has 
allowed President Obama to essentially create his own criteria for enacting 
these strikes, concentrating power within the Executive Branch. The costs and 
benefits of drone strikes are more easily understood than the legal framework 
that justifies them. The use of UAVs has had obvious positive outcomes when 
imminent threats are neutralized without having to place troops directly in 
harm’s way. Because the program is relatively new, the long-term implications 
are difficult to decipher. As mentioned previously, there have been theories 
regarding possible blowback, with drone strikes negatively affecting the U.S.’s 
goals. Also, the proliferation of drone technology has yet to be seen on a grand 
scale, such as an arms race; however, it is a possibility that the technology could 
45 Becker, Joe. Shane, Scott. “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,” 
New York Times, May 29, 2012. 
46 Op. cit. fn. 2 
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disseminate quickly, leaving questions about international policy regarding the 
use of drones. 
Foundationally, there is little concrete information on the exact formula
used by President Obama and his advisors when deciding on targets and when 
and where to strike. Further, the lack of foresight on the issue creates a vacuum 
and feeds speculation on future occurrences. Clearly there are national security 
concerns at stake, so full transparency is not an option. However, the United 
States needs to begin setting international precedent with the point in mind 
that other nations will garner this technology eventually. Essentially, the Obama 
administration needs to begin to look at the future of the UAV program instead 
of as a short-term solution to the problem of terrorism. 
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